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I. Introduction 
 
As a person whose life began in England and ended in North America and who 
maintained academic affiliations in the United Kingdom, Canada and the U.S., Campbell 
Watkins had a fine appreciation for the subtle differences that mark the two sides of the 
North Atlantic. He embodied the cross-fertilization that trans-Atlantic exchanges imply 
and I have no doubt that that was one of the reasons the IAEE received so much of his 
attention and benefited so grandly from it. This essay concerns one of those trans-Atlantic 
exchanges and one of which Campbell would have enjoyed the irony:  An American 
innovation that goes to Europe and becomes bigger than anything yet seen in North 
America. The transplant is the cap-and-trade form of emissions trading and the European 
application is the European Union CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). More 
specifically, this paper focuses on a particular feature of the allocation process in the 
European variant, the endowment of new entrants with allowances and the forfeiture of 
allowances when facilities are closed.  
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the world’s first cap-
and-trade program for CO2. It has been implemented by the twenty-five Member States 
of the European Union (EU) as one of the measures to fulfill their obligations under the 
                                                 
1 The author is senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at MIT and he was a visiting Fulbright 
scholar at the Université de Paris-1 when this paper was written. The paper is a contribution to the 
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Energy Journal and a former president of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE). 
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Kyoto Protocol. It applies to stationary sources larger than 20 MWe, generally fossil-fuel-
fired electricity generators and CO2 emitting industrial facilities and it covers 
approximately 52% of the CO2 emissions of the entire EU. The first stages of 
implementation occur in two distinct periods: a first “trial” period encompassing calendar 
years 2005-07 and a second period corresponding to the first commitment period under 
the Kyoto Protocol, 2008-2012.   
Although modeled after the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade system, the EU ETS is much larger 
in all dimensions. It includes about four times as many installations, approximately 
11,400 installations as compared to about 3,000 in the US SO2 program. The volume of 
annual emissions covered is a thousand times greater: approximately 2.2 billion metric 
tons of CO2 compared to about 18 million short tons of SO2 (before the 50% reduction 
imposed by the initial SO2 cap). Finally, although prices per allowance and per ton of 
emissions have been much higher in the SO2 program than in the EU ETS (from $70 to 
$1600 compared to 8 to 30 euros), the value of the allowance assets distributed in the EU 
ETS is about ten times that of the US SO2 program, about $50 billion compared with $5 
billion at current prices of 18 euros/metric ton and $600/short ton, respectively.  
Cap-and-trade programs create allowances, which are explicit limited rights to emit the 
specified substance, and all programs face the initial problem of allocation: deciding how 
to distribute these limited and prospectively valuable rights. In the U.S. program, 
allocation was decided centrally by the U.S. Congress as an integral part of Title IV of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. In the EU ETS, allocation is delegated to the 25 
member states, each of which is responsible for developing its own National Allocation 
Plan (NAP) subject to review by the European Commission. Despite this fundamental 
difference in allocation approach, both programs are alike is distributing nearly all of the 
allowances for free to the incumbents on whom the liability to surrender allowances 
equal to emissions is imposed.  
One of the notable differences between the EU ETS allocation of CO2 allowances and 
the U.S. allocations of either SO2 or NOx allowances concerns the treatment of new and 
closed facilities. Generally, new entrants in the U.S. do not receive allowances and 
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therefore must purchase whatever they would need from the market.2 Moreover, closed 
facilities are allowed to retain the initial endowments. In the EU, all 25 Member States 
have set aside a certain percentage of the total number of allowances for new entrants and 
most Member States require the owners of closed facilities to forfeit future allowance 
endowments at closure. Some Member States have also developed transfer rules whereby 
the allowances from a closed facility can be transferred to a new facility under certain 
well-specified conditions. 3  A further important condition of the new entrant 
endowments, like those to incumbents, is that once determined they are fixed in keeping 
with the criteria of no ex post adjustment of allowance endowments.  
This paper concerns the effect of these new entrant and closure provisions and 
specifically the means by efficient resource allocation is distorted. A considerable 
literature has already developed about these provisions generally within the context of 
over-all treatments of the allocation procedures in the EU ETS. Although all of these 
contributions recognize that the new entrant and closure provisions are distorting, the 
focus is as often on the diversity of these provisions among member states, and on the 
additional distortion thereby introduced into EU-wide investment by the carbon market, 
as it is on the more fundamental nature of the distortion. Moreover, many (Matthes et al. 
2005; Engenhofer et al., 2006; Neuhoff et al., 2006) see the main effect on the pricing of 
carbon and on the incentives thereby provided for investing in higher or lower carbon 
content technology.  Only Åhman et al. (2006) clearly state that the main effect is on 
output. None attempt a formalization of the effects on agent behavior and how this would 
influence product and emissions markets. This paper offers that formalization in the 
interest of clearly stating the channels by which resource allocation is distorted. The main 
clarification to the current discussion is that the primary effect of these provisions is to 
create over-capacity and that the effect on emission markets is indirect and more 
                                                 
2 Some exceptions occur in the NOx Budget Program, where allocation decisions have also been 
decentralized to the states. 
3 The most complete account of the details of the final new entrant, closure and transfer provisions is UBA 
(2005). Betz et al. (2004) provides the earliest account of these provisions based on the first versions of 
NAPs. As a result, some of the details in this early account are inaccurate as a result of further changes as 
NAPs were finalized. Godard (2003) provides another early evaluation of these provisions motivated by 
discussions during the development of the French NAP. 
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ambiguous. The unambiguous effect of over-capacity is to reduce output prices and to 
increase output. The effect on emissions will depend on the emissions characteristics of 
the new and extended capacity and of the production that is displaced by the excess 
capacity. Although increased demand for allowances and higher allowance prices seems 
likely, this outcome is by no means certain. It depends on what is displacing what. 
The next section of this paper models the effect of these provisions on agent behavior 
using a standard profit equation from which the usual first-order-conditions can be 
derived. The third section discusses what would be the effects of these provisions on 
output and emissions markets. The final section concludes.       
II. Effects on Agent Behavior 
 
Competitive market conditions are assumed so that agents are price takers in both 
output and emissions markets. A further assumption is that agents maximize profit where 
profit is most generally described as revenue less cost elements for variable costs, 
emissions cost and capital recovery.4 Short-run and long-run effects are distinguished by 
whether the capital stock is fixed or not, which among other things determines whether 
the cost element for capital recovery is included in optimization decisions. A distinction 
is also made between the prices applicable for short-run maximization and those for long-
run decisions. The price used for short-run profit maximization is assumed to be a single 
price that is known and applicable for the relatively short period over which the relevant 
output and abatement decisions are made and during which the capital stock is always 
invariable. The price used for long-run profit maximization is an expectation of the short-
run prices over the relevant horizon for the particular decision concerning investment in 
or removal of capital stock. The mean of this expectation can be thought of as a long-
term price, but it exists only in expectation. Realized prices are always the result of short-
term maximization. These differences are illustrated in the following three cases. 
                                                 
4 Obviously, where regulatory treatment intervenes, the results may differ. The purpose here is to 
understand the effects in the most basic case before taking institutional factors into account. 
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A. Short-run optimization with fixed allowances 
 
In keeping with standard economic theory, firms are assumed to produce so long as the 
current market prices are sufficient to cover marginal costs. The profit to be earned will 
be determined by the following short-term profit equation.  
[ ] ( )arqvrqCpq −−−= ,π        1) 
Where:      
π = short-term profit 
p = product price 
q = quantity produced 
C […] = short-run or restricted cost function 
r = emission rate per unit of output 
v = price of allowances 
a = fixed allowance allocation 
 
The environmental constraint is represented by the new argument, r, in the cost 
function for abatement and by the further cost component corresponding to the net effect 
of the emissions constraint on the firm’s profits taking into account the allowance 
endowment, a, and the new positive price on emissions, v. Note that the abatement 
argument of the restricted cost function is the emission rate instead of emissions.  This 
formulation reflects the circumstance that abatement decisions typically concern the rate 
of emissions and that emissions depend also on output, which responds to other 
considerations. The usual conditions apply to this short-run cost function, namely, 
0,0,0,0 2
2
2
2 >∂∂<∂∂>∂∂>∂∂ rCrCqCqC .  
Short-term profit maximization involves both a production and an abatement decision. 
These are assumed to be independent so that any level of abatement can be achieved with 
any level of feasible production.  The standard first-order conditions (FOCs) are  
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The environmental constraint introduces a new element into output decisions, the per-unit 
cost of emissions, which creates a wedge between the price of output and the marginal 
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cost of producing output without regard to emissions. The environmental constraint also 
adds another component to the optimization process, which then requires that the 
marginal cost of abatement per unit of output be equal to the emissions price. A typical 
example is provided by a coal-fired electricity generating plant choosing among coals of 
differing sulfur content with higher prices attached to lower sulfur coal. Switching to a 
lower sulfur coal would result in a higher cost for all the coal required to produce q.  
B. Long-run optimization with fixed allowances 
 
The long-run profit equation requires that initial capital expenditure enter the equation 
and that the prices be recognized as expectations..  
 [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ]qKrzarqvrqCqp ∗−−−−=Π δˆ,ˆ      3) 
Where: 
Π = Long-term expected profit at the time of investment 
δ = capital recovery factor to account for depreciation and interest cost 
z […] = initial investment cost per unit of capacity 
K* […] = optimal capacity 
 
First, Π  is used to denote long-run expected profit, which is different from that in 
equation (1) both in including the last right-hand-side term for capital recovery and in 
being based on expected output and emissions prices over much longer periods of time 
approximating the life of the investment. Second, the circumflexes over the output and 
allowance prices signify means of the distribution of expected prices over the time of the 
investment. In a sense, output, q, and the emission rate, r, could also be considered to be 
expectations, but these variables are under the control of the operator.  Finally, the capital 
recovery term is a function of output, which determines capacity, and abatement, which 
determines the initial capital cost per unit of capacity. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
both of these functions are linear and that the first derivatives take the following form. 
 00 <∂∂>∂∂ rzandqK        4) 
The FOCs of the long-run profit equation indicate the expected prices required to justify 
investment in output and abatement.  
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Both of these can be seen as thresholds, or entry prices, that trigger investment in 
capacity either to produce or to abate. The expected output price, pˆ , must be equal to 
short-run marginal costs plus an expected surplus that would allow the value of the initial 
capital investment to be recovered.  Production might well be expected to occur at prices 
lower or higher than pˆ , but the expected short-run profit surplus integrated over time 
would allow recovery of the initial capital investment. The variable, vˆ , expresses the 
same requirements and relations with respect to capital investment in abatement.    
C.  Long-run Conditions with New Entrant Provisions 
 
The distinguishing characteristic of short and long-run profit maximization in the 
preceding two sections is that the endowment of allowances, a, does not appear in any of 
the first order conditions. The allowance endowment has an effect on both short and 
long-run profits that compensates for the added environmental cost element, but it has no 
effect on output or abatement decisions of a profit-maximizing agent. The effects are 
purely financial.5  New entrant and closure provisions invalidate this observation for 
long-run optimization since the decision to invest in added capacity brings an endowment 
with it and a decision to close existing capacity involves the forfeiture of an existing 
endowment.  
The exact specification of the endowment to be given to new facilities differs 
considerably among the national allocation plans of the 25 member states of the 
European Union. Most provisions resolve into some form of endowment per unit of 
capacity or expected output.6 Implicitly, if not explicitly, the endowment assumes some 
emission rate, usually reflecting some notion of best available technology, and, if based 
on capacity, some level of utilization, often that for comparable existing facilities. 
                                                 
5 Åhman et al. (2006) provides a good discussion of these effects, which notes that financial effects can be 
important.   
6 Assuming some optimal relation between expected output and capacity, the two are equivalent. 
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Whatever the basis for determining the new entrant endowment, it is fixed once it has 
been granted and it does not vary according to actual production, unless the facility is 
closed. The effective prohibition on adjusting allowance endowments according to actual 
production implies that the allowances new entrants receive do not enter the short-run 
profit condition, as shown in equation (1), and that short-run output and abatement 
decisions are not affected.7 In the following equations, the new entrant endowment is 
modeled as a fixed endowment, e~ , that is scaled to optimal capacity, which is in turn a 
function of planned output. This endowment will typically be a multi-year grant so that it 
is greater than a, the portion of the endowment relevant to short-run maximization. The 
long-run profit equation now takes the following form. 
 [ ] [ ]( ) [ ] [ ]qKrzqKerqvrqCqp δ−−−−=Π ~ˆ,ˆˆ     6) 
The FOCs are: 
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There are three important points to draw from these conditions. First, the allowance 
endowment affects the entry price condition for determining investment in output 
capacity, unlike the case depicted in equation (5) because the endowment is contingent on 
the decision to invest in new capacity. Second, the endowment functions effectively a 
lump-sum payment that helps to offset the annual capital recovery charge by the expected 
value of the endowment. The third point to note is that the new entrant provision has no 
effect on abatement. While the agent receives an endowment that can be considered an 
offset to emissions cost, the agent is still required to pay the full market price for 
emissions. This follows from lump-sum character of the endowment and the scaling of 
the endowment to capacity, not to emissions or to investment in abatement. 
Consequently, the only direct effect of a new entrant endowment is to increase output 
capacity. 
                                                 
7 The policy of no ex post adjustment adopted by the European Commission has been appealed to the 
European Court of Justice by Germany who would adjust new entrant endowments according to deviations 
between predicted output, upon which the German new entrant endowment is based, and actual output.  
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In both the political and more academic discussion of new entrant provisions, there is 
considerable confusion about whether the agent is thereby freed from considering 
emissions cost. It is natural to think of the new entrant endowment as an offset to 
emissions cost, but it does not function in that manner. The agent must pay for emissions 
regardless and, so long as the new entrant endowment is invariable, the agent will 
optimize abatement as in equations (1) and (2). However, the new entrant endowment 
also does not have the same character as an up-front cash subsidy of initial capital cost, as 
might be suggested by equation (7). It would if emissions and financial markets were 
sufficiently developed that the endowment could be capitalized and sold for cash, but that 
will generally not be the case. In the EU ETS, the endowment is a promise from the 
government of an annual lump-sum endowment to compensate for emissions cost, 
although whether it will compensate more or less than fully will depend on the short-run 
abatement decisions of the agent. From a long-run or planning standpoint, how the offset 
is described doesn’t make much difference; its effect upon the entry price condition will 
be the same.  
A final point is that the value of the new entrant endowment is not insignificant. The 
Danish NAP is wonderfully explicit in stating exactly what a new power plant will 
receive: 1,710 EUA’s8 per year per MW of installed capacity. This number is based on a 
natural-gas-fired combined cycle unit realizing 60% efficiency and running 5000 hours a 
year. At 20 euros a ton of CO2, the value of this endowment is 34,200 euros annually. A 
reasonable estimate of the capital cost of a combined cycle unit is perhaps 600 euros per 
KW of capacity. With an annual capital charge rate for depreciation and interest of 15%, 
the annual capital recovery requirement is 75,000 euros. Almost half of this requirement 
is offset by the new entrant endowment! The percentage of the annual capital charge 
offset will vary depending on the capital cost per unit of capacity and the endowment of 
allowances per unit of capacity, and it might be expected to be less for other types of 
electric generation plant or for facilities in other industries. Each case would need to be 
analyzed separately, but it seems likely that a potentially substantial incentive to 
increased capacity has been provided. 
                                                 
8 European Unit Allowances, the formal name of allowances in the EU ETS. 
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D. The Effect of Closure Provisions 
 
As used in the EU ETS, and more generally, closure is a decision concerning the 
capacity to produce, not production itself.9 The profit equation for a closure decision is a 
cross between short-run and long-run conditions discussed previously. It is like the long-
run condition in affecting capacity and in involving price expectations, although over 
shorter time horizons. It is like the short-run condition in that the capital is sunk and there 
is consequently no capital recovery term. To denote this shorter period, the profit and 
price terms are marked by a prime. As an initial point of reference, the profit equation for 
non-closure and the corresponding FOCs are stated for situations in which there is no 
emissions constraint. 
 [ ] 0ˆ0ˆˆ >∂∂=′≥−′=Π′ qforqCpandqCqp     8) 
For any level of positive output, the expected profit must be non-negative and short-run 
marginal cost, no greater than the expected output price over the horizon that is relevant 
for the closure decision. Since no capital term is stated in the profit equation, the closure 
price, p′ˆ , is lower than the corresponding entry price for new investment. It is simply the 
price expectation that would recover short-run marginal cost of output over the relevant 
horizon.  
When an emission constraint is introduced, the non-closure condition becomes as in 
equations (9a) and (9 b) below according to whether the facility’s allowance endowment, 
a~ , is retained despite closure (9.a) or not (9.b). The FOC for abatement is not shown 
since it is unaffected by closure and equal to 
q
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9 Closure is variously described. Often it is tied to the retirement of the environmental permit to the facility. 
Sometimes a minimum level of production is prescribed. 
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It is clear from a comparison of equation (9a) with equation (8) that the introduction of 
a cost for emissions would lead agents to close more facilities than they would if this cost 
element were not present. A closure provision has the effect of introducing a new term a~  
(> a), which represents the endowment of allowances the value of which, av~ˆ , is forfeited 
by closure.  When stated on a per unit basis, as is done in this FOC, the pro rata share that 
would enter into the agent’s closure decision is this amount divided by planned 
production. This term implies that less capacity would be closed than would be the case 
without the closure provision. Moreover, and worse, if production has declined from 
what it was when the allowance endowment was initially made, so that the term in 
parentheses is negative, less plant closure would occur than if there were no emission 
constraint, that is, more than would occur in the situation depicted in equation (8). To the 
extent that q declines as the facility ages, closure provisions will have a strong distorting 
effect on capacity. 
E. The Effect of Transfer Provisions 
 
A transfer provision allows the owner of a closed facility to transfer that facility’s 
allowances to a new facility, which is thereby not eligible for a distribution of allowances 
as a new entrant. Depending on the specific provisions, the transfer may require common 
ownership of the closing and new facility, or the two may be linked by contract. Also, the 
timing of the closure and start of the new facility must be within certain defined time 
periods (for instance, 18 months before or after in the German NAP). Typically, the 
transfer is calibrated to the capacity of the closing and new facilities. Thus, if the closed 
facility is larger than the new facility, only the pro rata capacity share of allowances may 
be transferred. Similarly, if the new facility is larger, all the allowances of the old facility 
may be transferred and the new facility will be eligible for a new entrant endowment for 
the amount of capacity that is greater than that of the closed facility.  
The linking of closing and opening facilities, as required by transfer provisions, is in 
some sense artificial. New investments could be expected to be made, and installations to 
close, without such linkage. The relevant question is when would it be advantageous to 
the party or parties involved in such decisions to effect a linkage? From the standpoint of 
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a new entrant, it would be advantageous to make such linkage if the transferred 
endowment is greater than the new entrant endowment to which the new facility would 
otherwise be entitled. When ownership of the two facilities is common, the owner would 
use the transfer rule option only when this was the case. And when ownership is not 
common, the new facility would be willing to pay only for the quantity of allowances 
exceeding what it would receive without charge from the new entrant reserve. From the 
standpoint of the owner of the closing facility, the quantity of allowances equal to what is 
provided by the new entrant reserve for like capacity will be forfeited regardless. The 
only advantage in making the linkage is to realize the value of the allowances in excess of 
what is provided to new entrants for free.  
These arguments can be formalized using slightly modified notation for the new 
entrant and closure decisions when taken alone. Since the technologies used in the new 
and old units will not be the same, and therefore the variables for output and abatement, it 
is necessary to distinguish between the new and old capacity by superscripts N and O, 
respectively. The time horizons are also normalized to that pertaining to closure decisions 
to make the expected price terms comparable. In equations (10) and (11), the conditions 
facing new entrants are denoted by sub-equations (a) while those facing potentially 
closed facilities is given by (b). 
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The FOCs with respect to output are 
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The effect of the transfer rule is to substitute e~ for a~ in equations (10.b) and (11.b). The 
entry price condition remains unchanged for the new entrant (since the value of ( )eav ~~ˆ −′  
is either purchased or foregone) and the only effect is on the facility being considered for 
closure. The owners of these facilities are given an incentive to link up with some new 
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capacity in order to realize the value of their allocation in excess of the new entrant 
endowment. The price required for continued operation is higher as a result and more 
facilities could be expected to close, and less capacity to be available, than if the closure 
provision applied without the transfer rule.     
Although the effect of the closure rule on capacity is mitigated by a transfer rule, it is 
not eliminated. The closed facility still gives up an endowment equal to e~ that is freely 
available to new capacity. Consequently, the effect of the new entrant endowment 
remains and it affects facilities being considered for closure as well as new entrants. The 
effect of both provisions is to increase capacity.  
III. Effects on Output and Emissions Markets 
 
Market effects depend on how the additional capacity created by the new entrant and 
closure provisions affects output. This depends in turn on the nature of the markets and in 
the case of the EU ETS, two situations can be envisaged. In the first one, all participants 
in the relevant market are covered by the EU ETS as is the case for electricity production. 
In the other, corresponding to the non-electric industrial sector, those subject to the EU 
ETS constitute only part of the relevant product market.  
A. Electricity Markets 
 
In the short-run, electricity demand is famously inelastic and it is not too much of an 
exaggeration to represent short-run demand as a vertical line that moves back and forth 
along an upward-sloping supply or dispatch curve according to temperature, time of day, 
and other vagaries of electricity demand. In this limiting case, output will not be 
increased. The effect of extra capacity will be to shift the dispatch curve outwards and to 
reduce the clearing price for some hours depending on the extent to which production 
from the new capacity displaces existing capacity with higher short-run marginal costs.  
If the new capacity enters into base-load use and its running costs are lower than existing 
base-load units, then the clearing prices for most hours could be expected to be lower. 
Alternatively, if the new capacity has running costs that are relatively high, such that it 
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does not enter into base-load, but instead into cycling or peaking uses, the effect on prices 
will be less depending on the number of hours of use during the year. In summary, an 
output price decline of some (probably small) magnitude can be expected. 
The effect on emissions markets also depends on displacement effects and the 
differences between the emission rates for the new and displaced existing capacity. 
Generally speaking, new capacity can be expected to have lower emission rates than like 
existing capacity so that it could be expected that the new entrant provisions would lead 
to less demand for allowances for the same level of output and a lower allowance price. 
In general, this effect would hold to the extent that production from new coal-fired 
capacity displaces output from existing coal-fired capacity and that production from new 
gas-fired capacity displaces output from existing capacity that is either coal- or gas-fired. 
However, this circumstance might not hold if new entrant endowments differ according 
to fuel use or if other conditions, such as high natural gas prices, were to make new coal 
capacity the economic choice despite the higher emissions cost.  Also, as is pointed out 
repeatedly in the literature, new entrant endowments available only to CO2-emitting 
plants, whether coal or natural gas, will reduce the investment cost of the latter relative to 
carbon-free choices, such as renewables or nuclear, and may lead to more carbon-
emitting capacity and production than would otherwise be the case. In all these cases, the 
demand for allowances would be greater for meeting the same demand and allowance 
prices would be higher, not lower.  
There is another effect in electricity markets that must be taken into account: the effect 
on capacity markets. Producers of electricity derive revenue not only from the sale of 
electricity but also from the sale of capacity for stand-by or on-demand use. The effect of 
the new entrant provisions is obvious. Regardless of the effects on output and emissions 
markets, there will be more capacity available and the price for stand-by capacity will be 
lower. In fact, with highly inelastic demand, the effect of the new entrant provisions can 
be expected to fall almost entirely on capacity markets.  
In sum, the primary effect of the over-capacity induced by the new entrant and closure 
provisions as they would operate in the electricity sector will be on capacity markets, not 
on output or emissions markets. The effects on these latter two markets depend on the 
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extent to which production from other units is displaced and on the emission 
characteristics of the units displacing and being displaced. In general, electricity prices 
can be expected be lower for some percentage of annual hours, but the effect on the 
demand for allowances and therefore on allowance prices is ambiguous. If the 
assumption of no effect on short-run demand is relaxed, output would be slightly greater 
and this would cause less of a reduction in output price. Some elasticity in demand would 
also mean more demand for allowances and therefore upward pressure on allowance 
prices. Still, the basic conclusion for electricity markets would hold: lower output prices 
and ambiguous effects on allowance prices. 
B. Non-electricity Markets    
 
The distinguishing characteristic of the non-electric, industrial sectors is that output is 
sold on a market in which other producers are not subject to the EU ETS. Another 
characteristic of these sectors is that capacity markets are not important; output can be 
stored and excess capacity has no alternative use.  
Again, the first issue is the effect of the excess capacity on output. In general, the 
demand curve facing the European producers of industrial output can be expected to be 
more elastic than would be the case for electricity. The additional European capacity 
would lead to an increase of output by these producers and an increase in their share of 
total world output. Depending on the nature of the market, the (world) output price may 
or may not decline. If it were to do so, then the increase of European output would be 
slightly larger since the pie from which the increased European share is being taken is 
bigger. The effect is that of any subsidy to new capacity: more capacity is created than 
would otherwise be the case and expected result would be an increase in the market share 
of output. In contrast to the electricity case in which the effects are mostly on output price 
and only minimally on quantity, the non-electric industrial case can be characterized as 
de minimus effects on output price and some increase in quantity.  
Also, in contrast to the electricity sector, the effects on emissions markets of new 
entrant provisions for industrial installations are non-ambiguous. Increased output implies 
more emissions, more abatement with a fixed cap, and a higher price for allowances. The 
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difference in this case is that the displaced productive capacity and the associated 
emission reductions are outside of the EU ETS.  Of course, if the induced over-capacity 
were to displace other European production, the effects would be similar to those in the 
electricity case where the emission market effects depend on the characteristics of the 
displaced and displacing capacity. 
IV. Conclusion     
 
 The EU Emissions Trading System has introduced a new feature of emission 
allowance allocation that is generally not found in previous cap-and-trade systems. The 
new feature is allowing new entrants to receive an allowance endowment and requiring 
closed facilities to forfeit their endowments. This essay seeks to explore the implication 
of these provisions for agent behavior assuming profit maximization and the likely effects 
on output and emissions markets.  
Not surprisingly for something that is contingent on decisions concerning the capital 
stock, the only direct effects are on capacity. Agents’ short-run profit maximization will 
be affected only to the extent that the change in capacity due to these provisions has an 
effect on the clearing prices in output or emissions markets. Although these effects differ 
according to the nature of the market, the general effect will be to reduce output price and 
to increase output. Where capacity markets exist, as could be the case for electricity, 
these markets will be strongly affected.  
The effects on emissions markets are more ambiguous. In electricity markets, the 
demand for allowances will depend on the emission rates of the new capacity and that 
being displaced. This effect could go either way and result in either lower or higher EUA 
prices. In the case of industrial markets, the displaced capacity will be outside the EU 
ETS so that the effect of the new entrant and closure provisions will be unambiguously to 
increase the demand for allowances in the European system and to increase allowance 
prices.  
The conclusions of this exercise in comparative statics assume that the alternative is a 
carbon constraint without no new entrant or closure provisions. When these provisions 
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accompany the introduction of a carbon constraint, as is the case for the EU ETS, their 
effect will be to mitigate to some extent the effect of the carbon constraint on product 
markets. As noted by nearly all writers on this subject, this is one of the main reasons for 
the use of these provisions in the EU ETS.   
Still, from the standpoint of allocative efficiency, resources will be diverted to creating 
more production capacity than is needed and the output and emissions market effects are 
the simple reflection of the fundamental inefficiency of the over-capacity created by the 
new entrant and closure provisions. A further question that is not explored here is 
whether agents, rationally expecting this effect on output price, will adjust their 
expectations accordingly and thereby mitigate the over-capacity that would be otherwise 
created. 
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